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An Analysis of Gender Pay Disparity in the Nonprofit Sector:
An Outcome of Labor Motivation or Gendered Jobs?
Abstract:
Although pay differences between men and women with comparable characteristics are generally
smaller in the nonprofit than in the for-profit sector, gender pay gaps in the nonprofit sector vary
widely across industries. In some industries, gender pay gaps are as large as in the for-profit
sector, but in others, women make more than comparably qualified men. Using Hierarchical
Linear Modeling on the combined 2001-2006 American Community Surveys, we test nonprofit
labor motivation theories against a gendered-job hypothesis to explain this variation. We find
that gender pay gaps in the nonprofit sector are smaller in industries where nonprofits outnumber
for-profits and where higher proportions of female-dominated occupations exist.

Introduction

Women have historically played important roles in charitable work (Themudo, 2009;
Burbridge, 1994; Preston, 1994; Steinberg and Jacobs, 1994) and continue to comprise seven
tenths of the nonprofit workforce, compared to around 40 or 50 percent of the for-profit and
public sector workforces, respectively (Preston and Sacks, 2010; Leete, 2006). The
predominance of women in the nonprofit workforce makes gender pay equity important because
it can contribute to employee satisfaction and help ensure high quality work from an intrinsically
motivated staff (Leete, 2000). The nonprofit sector generally pays men and women more
equitably than the for-profit sector, but gender pay disparities vary widely across industries. We
examine why this variation exists in the nonprofit sector.
The literature suggests two major explanations. First, from an economics, utility-based
perspective, as nonprofits offer their employees more altruistic rewards, employees will accept
less monetary pay. As Steinberg (1990, 160) notes, the intrinsic benefits gained by contributing
to public goods or helping others derive from employees’ profession instead of their sector of
employment. However, because the nonprofit corporate form provides various advantages to
organizations producing public rather than private goods, nonprofits tend to outnumber forprofits in industries that produce greater public or altruistic outputs. Therefore, we expect
nonprofits in industries dominated by nonprofit organizations to pay less than nonprofits in forprofit dominated industries, as workers receive more of their compensation in the form of
intrinsic, socially motivated benefits rather than pay. This will shrink the pay gap between men
and women in nonprofit-dominated industries as managers emphasize equity in their pay
decisions in order to maintain a satisfied workforce (Leete, 2000) and as the expected pay
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reduction for men is greater than it is for women when they select nonprofit work (Preston,
1989).
Alternatively, from a sociological view, “women’s work” pays both men and women
worse than “men’s work” does (England et al., 1994). Occupations traditionally filled by women
pay less for comparably qualified workers than occupations traditionally filled by men, with the
pay penalty typically larger for men (de Ruijter and Huffman, 2003; Cohen and Huffman, 2003;
England et al., 1994). Thus, we expect industries with higher concentrations of traditionally
female occupations to pay all workers less, but this pattern will be especially strong for men,
leading to greater equity in earnings.
We expect both nonprofit and women’s work to lower men’s pay more than women’s,
leading to greater gender pay equity, and we test both hypotheses in this analysis. Using
hierarchical linear modeling (HLM) on the 2001-2006 American Community Survey (ACS), we
test the relative importance of the percentage of workers in an industry who work for nonprofits
and the concentration of female-dominated occupations on men’s and women’s pay across the
U.S. nonprofit workforce, controlling for individual characteristics.
We find evidence that lower earnings in industries dominated by nonprofits and
occupations dominated by women lead to greater relative gender pay equity within the same
industries but to greater pay disparities for workers of comparable characteristics across the
nonprofit workforce. These findings raise employment and efficiency concerns for nonprofits
concentrating in low paying industries. Already, close to 40 percent of nonprofits report staff
retention problems, with many employees leaving to higher paying nonprofit positions elsewhere
in the economy (Linscott, 2011; Opportunity Knocks, 2010). The persistence of low-paying

2

positions combined with increases in the pay and participation of women across professions
could lead to greater retention difficulties and lower performance of those nonprofits over time.

Literature Review

Nonprofit employees earn less than employees in other sectors. However, male-female
pay differentials for similarly qualified workers are smaller in the nonprofit sector (Preston and
Sacks, 2010; Leete, 2000; Preston, 1989). Preston (1990) argues that women disproportionately
prefer nonprofit employment because of greater gender equity in the sector. Controlling for
human capital characteristics, location, industry, and occupation, women earn less than men in
the nonprofit sector (Preston and Sacks, 2010; Leete, 2000; Ruhm and Borkowski, 2000;
Preston, 1990; Preston, 1989), but the male-female pay gap is around 8 percentage points smaller
in the nonprofit sector than in the for-profit sector (Lewis and Faulk, 2008; Leete, 2000).
However, the magnitude of the gender pay gap in the nonprofit sector varies significantly by
industry (McGinnis, 2011; Lewis and Faulk, 2008; Salamon and Sokolowski, 2006; Salamon,
2002; Leete, 2000; Ruhm and Borkowski, 2000). While nonprofits generally demonstrate greater
gender pay equity than for-profits, nonprofit gender pay gaps in some industries approach those
found in the for-profit sector (Lewis and Faulk, 2008). We find two potential explanations of this
variation in the literature.

Labor Donation and Worker Motivation Hypotheses
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First, intrinsic rewards generally attract employees to the nonprofit sector and
compensate for its lower pay (Handy and Katz, 1998; Preston, 1989; Mirvis and Hackett, 1983).
Nonprofit employees value the mission-related performance of the sector as part of their
compensation and are willing to accept lower wages (De Cooman, De Gieter, Pepermans, and
Jegers, 2009; Auteri and Wagner, 2007; Leete, 2006; Leete, 2000). Nonprofit organizations also
use bonus and pay-related incentives less than for-profits (Roomkin and Weisbrod, 1999), in part
because extrinsic motivation through pay incentives could conflict with the self-selection process
that attracts altruistic, mission-focused employees (Kreps, 1997).
However, nonprofits operate in many different industries with varying levels of public or
altruistic outputs (Young and Steinberg, 1995; Titmuss, 1970). Due to the public or private
nature of goods produced in different industries, nonprofit organizations are more active in
certain industries than in others. Only a few nonprofits exist in industries such as manufacturing
and construction that primarily produce private goods. Many more operate in industries such as
broadcasting, publications, and healthcare that produce a mix of public and private goods.
Meanwhile, nonprofits predominate in industries such as social services that produce more
public-oriented goods and services.
Nonprofits concentrate in industries that produce public goods partly because work
performance and outcomes in these industries are difficult to assess, which increases the severity
of information asymmetries between buyers and sellers, or principals and agents (Hansmann,
1987, 1980; Krashinsky, 1997, 1986; Easley and O’Hara, 1986). The goods produced may be
non-rival and non-excludable, such as public radio, where donors cannot assess the independent
impact that their specific contribution makes on the quality or quantity of the outputs.
Alternatively, donors or purchasers may not directly receive the services themselves. Examples
4

of these industries include nursing home care for Alzheimer’s patients, pre-school childcare, or
international relief. Since the person paying for the services does not receive them directly, they
cannot fully evaluate the quality of care, and the person receiving the care cannot fully report to
them. Nonprofits’ non-distribution constraint and mission-orientation rather than profitorientation lead consumers and the public at large to trust people working in nonprofits to
unscrupulously take advantage of such information asymmetries less than for-profit employees
(Handy and Katz, 1998; Hansmann, 1980).
Workers who will accept lower pay in exchange for mission-related satisfaction are more
likely to choose these industries than are more pay-focused employees, facilitating greater
internal trust within organizations and reinforcing society’s trust of nonprofits (Handy and Katz,
1998, 248). However, because intrinsic motivation is essential to a mission-focused workforce,
managers must maintain high motivation to retain employees and ensure high-quality work.
Because pay incentives are difficult to implement fairly due to the information asymmetries,
nonprofits in nonprofit-dominated industries rely heavily on the intrinsic motivation of their
employees (Leete, 2000; Kreps, 1997; Preston, 1990; Hansmann, 1980). In these settings, nonpecuniary work incentives, such as an equitable work environment, work-life balance, and
feeling a part of a team, all motivate high-quality work (Mirvis and Hackett, 1983). If women,
who represent a large proportion of the nonprofit workforce, feel they are not being paid
equitably to men, this would lower work productivity (Ben-Ner, Ren, and Paulson, 2010). This
creates a strong incentive for managers to design wages to be more equitable across workers to
provide a motivating work environment (Leete, 2000), which leads to lower wage dispersion in
industries that rely more heavily on intrinsic motivation. Thus, gender pay gaps may be smaller
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in more nonprofit-dominated industries due both to the wage compression associated with
everyone accepting less pay and to efforts to raise women’s pay to be more comparable to men’s.
Since nonprofit organizations operate in industries with a wide range of mixes of public
and private goods, managers’ dependence on intrinsic worker motivation varies across
nonprofits. Nonprofits in industries dominated by for-profit firms tend to have higher pay,
worker outputs that are more easily monitored and extrinsically rewarded, and less reliance on
intrinsic motivation. Therefore, the higher the predominance of nonprofits in an industry, the
lower the pay will be for all employees, in part to ensure self-selection of employees motivated
more by mission than pay, and the more equitably nonprofit managers will pay their employees
to maintain this motivation.
Hypothesis 1: The higher the percentage of employees in an industry who work for
nonprofit organizations, the lower pay will tend to be for both men and women with
comparable qualifications.
Hypothesis 2: The higher the percentage of employees in an industry who work for
nonprofit organizations, the smaller the gender pay disparities will tend to be.

Gendered Jobs Hypothesis
From a sociological perspective, occupations traditionally filled by women typically pay
comparable workers less than occupations traditionally filled by men. The pay penalty in
traditionally female jobs is larger for men (de Ruijter and Huffman, 2003; Cohen and Huffman,
2003; England et al., 1994). This pattern may be especially strong in nonprofits, as unpaid
female volunteers historically provided many services. This depressed pay in these positions
when nonprofits began to hire employees to fill them (Steinberg and Jacobs, 1994). Before the
6

twentieth century, women had few professional options, and some opted to dedicate themselves
as volunteers in health, social services, social justice, and other nonprofit positions (McCarthy,
1994). As these fields professionalized in the 1900s, women entered into paid professions, but
these jobs remained low-paying (Burbridge, 1994).
Thus, traditionally female jobs in the nonprofit sector pay less than other positions,
though research applying a gendered jobs hypothesis within the nonprofit sector has relied more
on descriptive statistics than on multivariate analysis (e.g., Gibelman, 2003). Outside of the
nonprofit context, however, a large body of research examines the impact of gender-dominated
occupations and industries on male-female pay gaps. A strong research stream on the gender
composition of occupations uses women’s self-selection into particular jobs, tokenism, or the
devaluing of women’s work to explain male-female wage differentials (Cohen and Huffman,
2003; deRuijter and Huffman, 2003; England et al., 1998; Odendahl and Youmans, 1994).
Multivariate analyses controlling for human capital and job characteristics (e.g., de Ruijter and
Huffman, 2003) find that both men and women earn significantly less in female-dominated than
in male-dominated occupations, but the pay disadvantage is larger for men. Thus, unexplained
gender pay gaps are smaller in female-dominated occupations.
The industries in which nonprofits operate vary in the proportion of their employees who
work in traditionally female occupations. We expect this variation to partially explain differences
in the magnitude of nonprofit gender pay gaps across industries. We expect nonprofits in
industries with higher proportions of employees in traditionally female occupations to pay
workers less, but more equitably, than nonprofits in other industries.
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Hypothesis 3: Nonprofit workers in industries with higher proportions of femaledominated occupations will experience greater gender pay equity since men will earn
less in those jobs.
Finding support for each of these three hypotheses would have different implications for
how we assess persistent gender pay gaps across the nonprofit sector. Support for either the labor
donation hypothesis (H1) or the gendered jobs hypothesis (H3) would indicate that gender pay
equity is the product of wages bottoming-out in certain industries rather than women’s pay being
raised to that of men with comparable characteristics. Alternatively, support for the equity
motivation hypothesis (H2) alone would defend the notion that managers intentionally set
women’s pay as high as men’s where intrinsic motivation is an important factor to employee
productivity. Women would earn more and earn more comparably to men in those industries.
Albeit through different mechanisms, finding support for either the labor donation or the intrinsic
motivation hypothesis would further support the notion that the nature of the goods produced
drives gender pay equity in the sector. In contrast, if gender pay equity is driven by workers
being paid less in industries dominated by traditionally female occupations, latent gender pay
discrimination could explain the apparent gender equity in those industries, raising concerns that
the historical and societal implications of ‘female work’ are the culprits of overall female pay
“equity” in the sector.
We test the relative importance of the gender composition of occupations versus the
nonprofit composition of industries on reducing gender pay disparities. Because women are
over-represented in nonprofit work (Preston and Sacks, 2010), nonprofit-dominated industries
may have both a greater need for intrinsic worker motivation and greater proportions of female
workers, potentially conflating the two effects. Therefore, we assess the independent effects of
8

the nonprofit-dominance of industries and the gender-dominance of occupations, controlling for
each in our analysis. The more nonprofits dominate an industry, the more equitable nonprofit pay
will be. However, we expect the female-dominance of occupations within industries to explain
part of this effect since nonprofit workers sort by occupation as well as by industry.

Data & Methodology

Data
We test our hypotheses using the Census Bureau’s annual American Community Survey
(ACS) for 2001 through 2006.1 Over those six years, the ACS includes data on 4.3 million
private-sector workers, including over 400,000 who work for nonprofit organizations. We use
all 4,311,000 private-sector workers to calculate the nonprofit percentage of each industry and
the female percentage of each occupation. We restrict our analysis to 346,000 white, nonprofitsector employees to allow us to focus on gender pay gaps. Due to missing data, the final sample
comprises 313,670 nonprofit workers.

Method
Because we use variables measured at the individual, occupation, and industry levels, we
use a two-level Hierarchical Linear Model (HLM). The second level of the model includes
industry-occupation groups in a cross-classified second level (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002),
since workers are sorted by both industry and occupation. HLM is superior to OLS regression for
our purposes because HLM recognizes that the workers are nested in industries and occupations,
9

and it allows the regression coefficients to vary across industries and occupations. Since previous
studies have shown that nonprofit gender pay gaps vary by industry, we cannot assume that
gender has a fixed effect on pay across industries (Loeb, 2003).
While using interaction terms in OLS allows slopes and intercepts to vary, HLM allows a
richer interpretation of such variance. We can demonstrate what percentage of the variance is
attributed to differences between industry-occupation groups and the percentage of variance that
takes place within industry-occupation groups (Loeb, 2003). This permits us to determine how
much gender pay gaps vary across industries, controlling for individual characteristics, and the
extent to which the nonprofit-dominance of the industry and the female-dominance of
occupations explain that variance.

Variables and Models
Our dependent variable is the natural logarithm of earnings in the previous year
converted to 2006 real dollars using the consumer price index (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2009).
We code our gender variable 1 for women and 0 for men. Variables on the first (individual) level
include a dummy for whether individuals work part-time (less than 40 hours a week or 48 weeks
a year), hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, estimated experience, estimated
experience-squared, state, a dummy for people who are not proficient in English, a dummy for
having a disability, and two sets of dummies for educational attainment and year. We calculate
estimated experience by subtracting individuals’ years of education and six years of preeducation from their age. As is common in wage studies, we also include squared experience
because we expect earnings to increase at a decreasing rate with experience.
[Table 1 Here]
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Our second level comprises 16,538 industry-occupation cells generated by combining
detailed industry and occupation information for nonprofit workers in the U.S. workforce. These
industry-occupation cells include all combinations found in the sample between the 250 detailed
census industry categories and the 845 detailed census occupation codes. To test our hypotheses,
we introduce two main variables on this second level of analysis, one that varies by industry and
one that varies by occupation.
To test the labor donation and equity motivation hypotheses (H1 and H2), we measure
the nonprofit dominance of each industry, calculated as the percentage of its employees who
work for nonprofits. This variable is roughly comparable to Weisbrod’s (1988, 75)
“collectiveness (or publicness) index,” reflecting the degree of public rather than private good
outputs generated by nonprofit industries. As that measure is typically calculated as the percent
of organizations’ revenues that comes from contributions and the ACS measures data at the
individual level, our measure captures the nonprofit nature of an industry using workers rather
than revenues. We also include the percent nonprofit squared, since Lewis and Faulk (2008) find
a curvilinear relationship with wage. We calculate these variables by industry, yielding 250
unique values across all industry-occupation groups. Industries in the sample range from 0.4% to
100% nonprofit. The average industry is 25 percent nonprofit (Table 1).
To test the gendered jobs hypothesis, we follow previous studies (e.g., de Ruijter and
Huffman, 2003) by including the percent of employees in each person’s occupation in the private
sector workforce who are women. We measure this variable for each occupation code,
generating 845 unique values. After excluding for-profit workers, close to 70 percent of the final
sample is female, which is consistent with previous research (Preston and Sacks, 2010; Leete,
2006). This demonstrates the prevalence of female employment in the nonprofit sector.
11

However, female sorting by occupation varies widely across the sector. Occupations range from
0% to 98.3% female, with an average of 48 percent.
We divide both industry-occupation variable percentages by 10 so that coefficients
represent changes in earnings for each ten-percentage point increment in the nonprofit share of
industries’ workers and occupations’ female representation, respectively. We interact these
industry-occupation variables with gender to explain differences between industry-occupation
groups in women’s expected earning gaps, controlling for the other variables in the model.
Incorporating each of these variables, we develop the following two-level model2:
First level: ln(earnings)=b0j+b1jFemale+b2jX+rij
Second Level:
b0j=γ00+γ01NP+ γ02NP2+γ03FM+ u0j
b1j=γ10+γ11NP+ γ12NP2+γ13FM + u1j
b2j=γ20
Combined Model:
ln(earnings)= γ00+γ01NP+ γ02NP2+γ03FM+ γ10Female+γ11Female*NP+
γ12Female* NP2+ γ13Female*FM + γ20X +rij
Where:
Female = 1 if female and 0 if male
X = all control variables (part-time status, state, English ability,
disability, education, hours worked per week, weeks worked per year, estimated
experience, estimated experience2, and year)
NP = Percentage of nonprofit employees within industries
NP2= Squared percentage of nonprofit employees within industries
FM = Percentage of female employees within occupations

Our analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we run a fully unconditional model including
female as the independent variable without controls to determine the base-level variance of the
gender pay gap across industries and occupations. Second, we introduce our level-one
(individual) variables. The proportional reduction in the pay gap variance from the base model to
the full level-one model indicates how much of the variance across industries and occupations is
12

explained by differences between individual worker characteristics.3 The coefficient on female
in this model is essentially the average within industry-occupation pay gap across industries and
occupations. The full level-one model also provides a partially conditional model from which to
measure the amount of between-group variance we explain with the industry-level variables in
the subsequent models. Third, we add the percentage of employees in an industry who work for
nonprofits. We expect this to lower pay for both men and women but for its effect to be stronger
for men. Therefore, the female coefficient should shrink. Fourth, we add the percentage of
workers in each person’s occupation who are women. We expect the percent female of an
occupation to have a negative effect on earnings for all workers, but especially for men. Since we
expect industries dominated by nonprofits to have higher proportions of employees in “female”
occupations, we expect part of NP’s effect to be indirect through FM. Therefore, we expect the
fully conditional model to estimate (1) weaker direct effects (i.e., weaker coefficients) of NP
than model 3, (2) significant negative effects of FM on expected earnings across industries and
occupations, and (3) significant positive moderating effects on expected male-female pay equity.
Calculating the proportions of intercept and slope variances that this model explains, compared
to the unconditional and partially conditional models, allows us to determine how much our
models contribute to explaining nonprofit pay variance across industries and occupations
(Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). This and any remaining unexplained intercept and slope variance
can help inform future research directions concerning nonprofit pay equity.

Analysis
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As can be seen in the correlation matrix in Table 2, without introducing any controls,
being female and the percentage of females in an occupation are moderately and negatively
correlated with earnings. The percentage of nonprofits in an industry is weakly and negatively
correlated with earnings. Interestingly, and unexpectedly, being female has a slight negative
correlation with the percentage of nonprofits in industries. This indicates that, conditional on
working in a nonprofit occupation, women are slightly less likely to work in industries that
include a higher percentage of nonprofits. Particularly important for this analysis, the percentage
of nonprofits in an industry and the percentage of females in an occupation have a very weak,
negative correlation, making it unlikely that one variable completely explains the other.
[Table 2 Here]
Figure 1, below, graphically demonstrates the lack of correlation between the nonprofitdominance of industries and the female-dominance of occupations. The figure demonstrates the
mean percent nonprofit and the mean female composition of occupations for each major industry
category. It is clear from the figure, as well as from the correlation above, that neither women
nor female-dominated occupations are systematically grouped within industries with higher
proportions of nonprofit workers.
[Figure 1 Here]
The base (fully unconditional) model in Table 3 shows that not controlling for any
individual or industry-occupation variables, females on average earn around 24.8 percent less
than males in the nonprofit sector. Though not reported in Table 3, the base model also indicates
that there is significant between industry-occupation variance of the female earnings gap to
explain with level-2 variables (τ01 = 0.088, p<0.001).
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The full level-one model, including all individual level controls, shows that much of the
unexplained variance in the gender wage gap for nonprofit workers in the base model is
explained by individual level characteristics. Controlling for individual characteristics, the
female earnings gap variable is estimated to be around 14.2 percent. The τ01 variance statistic for
the female earnings gap is still significant (p<0.001) but drops to 0.018, indicating that the full
individual controls explain almost 80 percent of the variance in female earnings gaps across
industry-occupation groups. This statistic also provides the base level-one variance τ01 to assess
the proportional reduction in τ01 with the two-level models.
[Table 3 Here]
The partial 2-level model introduces the percent nonprofit of industry variables to explain
the variance in the female earnings gap effect on expected earnings across industry-occupation
cells. These cross-level interactions may be interpreted as interaction terms in standard OLS
models. As shown in the Partial 2-level model in Table 3, we find support for the labor donation
hypothesis (H1) but not the equity motivation hypothesis (H2). According to the labor donation
hypothesis (H1), the stronger the nonprofit-dominance of an industry (NP), the lower the
earnings of both men and women will be, holding their other characteristics constant. This
shrinks the male-female earnings gap as %NP increases through men earning closer to a pay
floor rather than through women earning more than women with comparable characteristics in
other industries.
The percent nonprofit of an industry at the intercept is the sample mean of 25 percent.
From this base, a ten percentage point increase in the percent nonprofit of one’s industry
decreases men’s expected earnings by around 10.2 percent, holding individual characteristics
constant and accounting for the squared term. When 25 percent of the industry is nonprofit,
15

controlling for individual characteristics with mean work hours, weeks, and experience, women’s
expected pay is around 16.8 percent lower than men’s. A 10-point rise in %NP lowers men’s
expected earnings by 10.2 percent but only lowers women’s by 6.0 percent. Thus, the expected
male-female pay gap shrinks by 4.2 percentage points.
With a significant positive squared NP term, this effect is expected to be curvilinear with
a decreasing negative effect of NP through the range of the data. For women, expected earnings
are around 16.8 percent lower than the earnings of men with comparable characteristics in
industries with the sample mean of a 25 percent nonprofit workforce. With each ten percentage
point increase in the percent nonprofit, the earnings gap is expected to shrink at a decreasing rate
as NP increases. The combined male and female impacts on expected earnings from differences
in the percent nonprofit of their industry lead to a shrinking gender earnings gap across
industries, moving from industries with a low percentage of nonprofit to industries with higher
percentages.
The fully conditional 2-level model in Table 3 introduces the percent female of
occupations variable in addition to the percent nonprofit of industries to determine the
independent effects of these industry-occupation variables. This also allows us to determine if
the percent female of one’s occupation explains any of the effect that the percent nonprofit of
one’s industry has on his or her expected earnings in the nonprofit sector. The gendered jobs
hypothesis (H3) expects that percent female will have a negative association with male and
female earnings but that men’s will drop more sharply than women’s, which will lead to a lower
female earnings gap in “female” jobs. As shown in Table 3, these findings support this
expectation. Men are expected to receive around a 6.4 percent earnings penalty with every 10
percentage point increase in the percentage of females in their occupation, while women receive
16

an earnings penalty that is around 1.7 percentage points smaller. These findings also show that
the percentage of females in one’s occupation indeed explains part of the effect that nonprofitdominance of industries has on earnings. Controlling for occupations’ gender composition and
accounting for the squared term, the direct effect of a ten percentage point increase in the
nonprofit makeup of an industry on men’s expected earnings drops from a -10.2 percent to a -7.8
percent impact. For women, the cross level interaction between percent nonprofit and female
lessens the negative effect of a ten percentage point increase in an industry’s nonprofit
composition on expected earnings by only 2.8 rather than 4.2 percentage points. Thus, instead of
the gender pay gap shrinking by 6.0 percentage points with a 10-point increase in %NP, as in the
partial two-level model, it shrinks by only 5.0 percentage points controlling for %FM. Therefore,
the labor donation hypothesis (H1) is still supported, but we also find support for the gendered
job hypothesis (H3).
The fully conditional (Full 2-Level) model explains 84 percent of the gender earnings gap
variance from the fully unconditional model. Compared to the base of the full level 1 model, the
industry and occupation variables explain 22 percent of the between industry-occupation cell
variance in the female earnings gap and 7 percent of the male earnings intercept variance across
industries and occupations. There is still a significant amount of between industry-occupation
gender earnings gap variance (τ01 = 0.014, p<0.001) left to explain, which could be approached
with future research.
[Figure 2 Here]
For illustrative purposes, the graph in Figure 2 demonstrates the expected male-female
earnings differences from the full 2-level model across the major industry categories that include
U.S. nonprofit employees. These estimates are calculated for hypothetical full-time English
17

proficient college graduates in 2006 without disability and with average experience working in
an occupation with the average percentage of females and in an industry with the average
percentage of nonprofit employees in each industry category. As shown, taking into account both
changes in the nonprofit composition of industries and occupations’ gender composition across
industries, men and women with comparable characteristics are expected to have larger
unexplained gender wage discrepancies in industries that have lower shares of nonprofit workers
in the broader U.S. private industry labor market. In industries with greater proportions of
nonprofit employees, male and female earnings are expected to be more equitable, with women
expected to earn slightly more than men in nonprofit-dominated industries. However, as is clear
in the downward trend for both male and female earnings across industries, this equity comes at
a cost to both males and females who face drastic earnings penalties for working in those
industries.

Conclusion

We find evidence that labor donations are higher in industries with greater percentages of
nonprofits. We also find that occupations dominated by female employment pay less than
gender-neutral or traditionally male occupations. Instead of intentionally compensating women
more equitably in the nonprofit sector, relative gender pay equality appears to be a convenient
consequence of men accepting lower pay in traditionally nonprofit and female jobs.
Overall, this analysis demonstrates the importance of explaining pay differentials
between industries and occupations in the nonprofit sector. Findings show very different
18

outcomes and implications regarding industry earnings structures across the nonprofit sector than
have been shown in previous studies (see Preston and Sacks, 2010) that only control for industry
and occupation without allowing for and explaining randomly varying effects between industries
and occupations. As shown above, both the proportion of nonprofit employees in individuals’
industries and the proportion of female employees in individuals’ occupations are related to
workers’ earnings in the U.S. nonprofit sector. Each of these variables has a negative relationship
with overall pay levels and a simultaneous positive association with gender pay equity. So, even
though previous research on pay gaps in the U.S. economy highlights how much more equitable
the nonprofit sector is, this analysis identifies persistent inequalities within the sector.
Nonprofit employees’ individual human capital characteristics, location, English ability,
work status, experience, and hours and weeks worked explain a large portion of the gender pay
gap variance across the nonprofit sector. Industry and occupation differences, however, play an
important role in determining the overall pay return from those individual characteristics. Both
male and female nonprofit employees in industries dominated by for-profit work and in maledominated occupations receive the largest pay returns on their human capital and individual
characteristics, even though the unexplained gender pay gap in these industries and occupations
is greater than in industries and occupations with higher proportions of nonprofit and female
workers. Restricting our analysis to white employees limits us from confidently generalizing
these findings to minority workers, but we would expect these same general relationships to be
present in the broader population employed in the U.S. nonprofit sector.4
This analysis raises some important issues in terms of equal pay in the nonprofit sector.
Primarily, individual employees of similar characteristics do not earn equal pay for their human
capital across the sector. Furthermore, this pay penalty for both men and women systematically
19

increases as the nonprofit-dominance of industries increases, even controlling for the alternative
explanation regarding the impact of female dominated occupations. As discussed above, this
supports the labor donation hypothesis. However, this still raises important implications for
nonprofit managers, leaders, and funders in nonprofit-concentrated industries. These results
imply that organizations’ compensation of human capital in these industries may not allow them
to fully compete for labor in the market. With higher mobility of employees between sectors and
industries, increasing turnover in traditionally nonprofit and female jobs, and the increasing entry
of women into professions across the economy, relying on labor donations to fill traditionally
nonprofit positions may be increasingly untenable for attracting and maintaining a highly
satisfied and productive workforce. Employers may find themselves better off by breaking away
from dependence on short-term labor donations and instead focusing on the comparable worth of
their employees, not just in terms of equal gender pay but between-industry pay equity as well.
While female workers in industries that are highly saturated with nonprofit employment
earn more equitable pay, this equity comes at a high cost in terms of expected pay for both male
and female nonprofit employees compared to their peers in industries with fewer nonprofits.
Even if low pay structures ensure a highly altruistic workforce in industries with greater public
or collective outputs, is it worth a constant turnover from lack of pay advancement in these
industries? From a sector- or society-wide perspective, do we value work in these industries less
than work in industries with greater for-profit dominance? Again, in terms of attracting high
quality employees across the sector, what are the implications of maintaining these industry
earnings patterns? If the positive motivational effect of equal pay in low paying industries is
overcome by the negative motivational effect of being paid less than employees in other
industries, higher levels of funding in nonprofit-dominated industries to encourage higher, more
20

competitive earnings may be warranted. From an empirical standpoint, we cannot answer these
questions with these data, but we raise them for future research.

21

End Notes
1

The data and other information on the American Community Survey are publicly available
from the Census Bureau’s website (www.census.gov/acs). Like previous studies using Census
data, there are some limitations to using these data. Primarily, the nature of census data limits us
from making strongly defensible arguments regarding the causal relationships between variables
in our models. We are unable to track individuals across time, and we cannot randomly assign
individuals into jobs and industries. We also lack data on potentially important organizational
variables.
2

We center all interval level-1 variables (e.g., experience) at their industry-occupation means
(level-2 group) since group-mean centering yields more consistent and reliable estimates in
multilevel models with cross-level interactions as is done in this analysis (Enders and Tofighi,
2007; Hofmann and Gavin, 1998; Kreft, de Leeuw and Aiken, 1995). Centering at the sample
means results in estimates that are comparable to those shown in this analysis. All level-1
dummy variables are uncentered, and all level-2 variables are grand-mean centered on the
sample mean.
3

The proportional reduction in the variances (formally, τ00 and τ01) of these parameter estimates
between groups is calculated by subtracting the final variance from the initial variance and
dividing by the initial variance (Raudenbush and Bryk, 2002). For example, (τ00-unconditional - τ00conditional) / (τ00-unconditional) gives the proportional reduction in τ00 from the unconditional to the
conditional model.
4

We do not include minority workers due to the additional complexity including those variables
would add to the models. Previous studies (e.g., Leete, 2000) indicate that race would also
explain some pay variation in the larger population of nonprofit workers, although it is unclear
how race would interact with the second level variables in our models. Leete (2000) finds that
minorities in addition to women are paid more equitably in the nonprofit sector, so similar
relationships between minority pay equity and percent nonprofit may exist.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics on Key Variables
Level-1 (Individual Level) Variables (N=313,670)
Variable Name
Mean
SD
Min.
Max.
All
Male Female
Ln(Earnings)
10.26
9.92
10.03
1.2
1.4
13.8
Female
0.00
1.00
0.67
0.5
0.0
1.0
Part-Time
0.36
0.54
0.48
0.5
0.0
1.0
Hours
40.81 35.49
37.2
13.3
1.0
99.0
Weeks
45.98 45.17
45.4
12.8
1.0
52.0
Limited English
0.01
0.01
0.01
0.1
0.0
1.0
Disability
0.10
0.08
0.09
0.3
0.0
1.0
Experience
23.75 23.45
23.6
14.0
0.0
83.0
Experience Squared
773.5 737.6
749.3
729.6
0.0
6,889.0
High School Degree
0.38
0.50
0.46
0.5
0.0
1.0
College Degree
0.24
0.28
0.27
0.4
0.0
1.0
Masters Degree
0.18
0.14
0.16
0.4
0.0
1.0
Professional Degree
0.06
0.02
0.03
0.2
0.0
1.0
Doctoral Degree
0.07
0.02
0.03
0.2
0.0
1.0
Level-2 (Industry-Occupation Cells) Variables (N=16,538)
Variable Name
Mean
SD
Min.
Max.
% Nonprofit in Industry
25.4
32.0
0.4
100.0
% Nonprofit Squared
1,673.0 3,020.0
0.2
10,000.0
% Female in Occupation
47.5
27.6
0.0
98.3
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix of Key Variables

Earnings
Female
% Nonprofit
% Female

Earnings
1.0000
-0.2089
-0.0677
-0.1602

Female

% Nonprofit

% Female

1.0000
-0.0380
0.5100

1.0000
-0.0469

1.0000

(obs=313670)
All correlations are significant at p<0.001
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Table 3: Multilevel Earnings Gap Analysis

Female Earnings Gap

Base Model

Level 1

Partial 2-Level

Full 2-Level

-0.248***
(0.008)

-0.142***
(0.005)

-0.168***
(0.007)
0.046***
(0.005)
-0.004***
(0.000)

-0.157***
(0.007)
0.031***
(0.005)
-0.003***
(0.000)
0.017***
(0.002)

10.115***
(0.009)

9.573***
(0.035)

9.597***
(0.035)
-0.109***
(0.009)
0.007***
(0.001)

9.586***
(0.035)
-0.083***
(0.009)
0.005***
(0.001)
-0.064***
(0.003)

% Nonprofit*Female
% Nonprofit Squared*Female
% Female*Female
Male Earnings (Intercept)
% Nonprofit
% Nonprofit Squared
% Female
Includes Controls

No

Yes

Yes

Yes

Dep. Var. = ln(earnings)
***p<0.001
**p<0.01
* p<0.05
Robust Standard Errors in parentheses
%NP and %FM variables are measured in 10% increments
Individual control variables are centered around each industry-occupation mean
Industry-Occupation variables are centered around the grand mean
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Figure 1: Industries by Proportion Nonprofit and Proportion Female
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Figure 2: Expected Earnings by Industry Category*

*for full-time, English proficient college graduates in 2006 without disability and with average experience, hours
and weeks worked, and based on average values of %NP and %Female (occ.) by industry category
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